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Ticket Scalping in the Late 1800s and the early 2000s – Much has Changed, Much is the Same
James Devine

Overview
In the 1800s, theatergoers were frustrated by ticket speculators, who frequently purchased many
if not all of the tickets in advance of a show, despite efforts to stop them. These tickets were
later resold at inflated prices. There was little to no legislation at this time, so private parties
tried to limit the problem through various measures. Scalpers in the 1800s were able to
circumvent the physical lines and other rules using various measures, such as proxies. The
situation facing concert-goers in the 2000s, is similar to that of the theater patron in the 1800s.
The consumer today is frustrated by modern day scalpers, who circumvent the ‘virtual line’
using special software. Private measures are being used to address the issue, but not without
criticism from consumers. Meanwhile, in the absence of on-point legislation, inappropriate
federal law has been applied to the practice of ticket scalping, to varying degrees of success.
Going forward, a uniform federal law is recommended as suited to clarify existing legislation,
avoid the frustration inherent in varying state law, and address the modern day issues in the
secondary resale market. However, given how long it took for early legislation to be adopted, it
may take years, or may not happen at all given effectiveness of private remedies.
I.

The 1800s
a. The Problem Then

“It is nevertheless true that gangs of hardened ticket-speculators [scalpers] exist and carry on
their atrocious trade with perfect shamelessness.”1
Ticket scalping is a practice Americans became familiar with as early as the 1800s,
existing “since at least 1850, and probably well before that.”2 During this time, the resale of
tickets was widespread,3 and was perceived as a problem.4 Unsurprisingly, the major issues of
the time were similar to those of today. Then, as now, it was not uncommon for the average
consumer to search for tickets in the primary market to no avail, only to find them on the
secondary market,5 often at inflated prices;6 venues often engaged in their own efforts to curb
ticket scalping, and society was not altogether opposed to the practice of ticket scalping. Then,
as now, the popularity of a show would bring about a corresponding demand and inflated price.
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In an extreme example, tickets for Charles Dickens’ second American tour in the 1860s, with an
original face value of $5, were available from speculators for $50.7
The major actor in secondary sales in this time were individuals or networks of men
known as “ticket speculators” who would purchase large amounts of tickets at once, only to
resell them at inflated prices.8 Ticket speculators, described as “a pariah” in 1883,9 were also
referred to as “sidewalk men”, as this is where they would often be seen selling tickets.10
Scalping was a successful enterprise at this time,11 and scalpers would invest large amounts of
capital, buying up to 80% of tickets in advance.12 Fierce rivalry for “speculating privileges”
resulted in death.13 Scalpers would also engage the use of ‘proxies’, thereby bypassing long
lines of regular theatergoers, often buying the whole lot of tickets before others got a chance.14
The use of proxies was a difficult practice to regulate.15
Some actors in the reselling chain are the same as today. Many believed, justifiably, that
theater managers colluded with secondary sellers, withholding seats and passing them to
scalpers.16 Others with occasional early access to tickets later resold them at a higher price.17
Artists themselves were known to withhold tickets and resell them.18

Hotels often received

advanced tickets as a fringe for out-of-town guests—many resold at slight mark up.19 At the
time, grocers received advanced tickets for posting an advertisement in their windows, with an
implicit “understanding . . . that [they] would not be sold to scalpers . . . but of course, they were
sold regularly.”20

Even students, such as those of Princeton and Yale, would resell tickets at

inflated prices when given early access.21
During this time, law enforcement was involved, and there were arrests and prosecutions
to varying degrees of success. Four men were charged with disorderly conduct in New York in
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1868 (discharged),22 though a Boston man was convicted and fined successfully in 1873.23 The
presence of police was often enough to stop scalpers from selling tickets.24

b. Legislation
Though the majority of complaints from the public targeted increased prices and the
unavailability of tickets, the presence and prominence of ticket scalpers in the streets was also a
bother to many citizens.25
In these early years, there were several attempts to pass legislation, but such attempts
were generally infrequent and unsuccessful during this period.26 In New York, legislation failed
to be passed in 1870,27 1884,28 and 1908.29

New York City took it upon itself to ratify and

regulate the practice, passing an ordinance in 1880 that required ticket speculators to obtain a
license and a badge for a fee.30 Although there were numerous complaints levied against the
legislation,31 and an official opinion of the Board of Alderman recommending its repeal four
years later,32 the legislation stood.
However, ticket scalping legislation was eventually enacted in as early as the late 1800s
and early 1900s.33 The early legislation relates to the Sherman and Clayton Act’s regulation on
price fixing.34 Legislation increased significantly in the post-World War II period, as increased
leisure spending resulted in increased scalping and therefore increased legislation across the
states.35 The early legislation was “aimed to control the location, price, and nuisance effects.”36
In the early years, there were doubts as to the constitutionality of ticket scalping legislation,37 but
these have long been dismissed.38
c. Themes

3

The effects of ticket scalping in the 1800s were similar to those today in three major
ways. First, tickets were often unavailable in the primary market, leaving the average consumer
to search for tickets in the secondary market. Second, the absence of legislation resulted in
private efforts to curb the problem. Third, society was engaged in a philosophical debate—there
were those of the belief that the speculators were not a problem, but served a valuable purpose.
Theaters tried to comply with the demand of their customers who were frustrated by
ticket speculation.39 The theaters engaged in several methods to satisfy the angry customers and
curb ticket speculation. One of which was to use “spotters” who would note anyone who bought
a ‘speculated’ ticket, and then prohibit their entrance at the door.40 This was a common tactic in
the 1870s, which inevitably “led to many angry confrontations between ticket holders and door
staff.”41 Another is limits per person42 but these were often ineffective,43 given the use of
proxies.44 Management for Eastern Park, Brooklyn, which hosted the Princeton-Yale game in
November of 1890, employed both a limit per person (4 tickets), and waited until the last minute
to add 1500 reserved seats for the face value of $2, so as to combat scalpers.45
Further measures included complicated registering systems,46 and competing directly
with theater employees go out on the sidewalk and compete with the scalper, offering the ticket
at the lower (face) price.47 Auction systems for ticket sales were used as a response to high
demand in as early as 1860,48 though they were of limited success when overrun by scalpers.49
There were also debates about ticket scalping. Though an 1893 editorial described the
practice of ticket scalping as a “species of petty extortion”,50 others questioned if ticket scalping
should be so vilified. Then, as now, there were those who viewed ticket scalpers as providing at
least some benefit, such as making tickets available at a later time for the consumer who does not
buy tickets in advance.51 An editorial for the 1875 theatrical season argued that venues should

4

seek to regulate scalpers, but not completely eliminate them, as some are useful.52 Some theater
goers preferred to pay a premium instead of standing in line.53 Scalpers also made tickets
available to those who chose to go last minute, or for out-of-town travelers who would not have
been able to purchase them in advance.54 When the Fifth Avenue Theater’s private efforts at
curbing scalping were so successful 1885, patrons complained of “the absence of speculators.”55
II.

The 2000s
a. The Problem Now
“Despicable scumbags. If there’s a way to publicly shame them, we should.”56
As in the 1800s, the current secondary ticket market is often a source of frustration for

the average consumer.57 Though we have progressed from the old image of the typical scalper58
(outside of a venue) the scalping ‘problem’ still exists. Though these local re-sellers are still in
play, and are worthy of legislation in and of themselves,59 the bulk of scalping today occurs on
the internet at great distance from the venue, via internet sites such as StubHub, TicketsNow,
craigslist, eBay, and Facebook. Compounded with the prevalent online market, there is little
transparency with respect to concert ticketing; artists withhold tickets to their own shows and
resell them on secondary sales sites.60 Further, ticket brokers, in the states that allow them, often
sell tickets above face value and can be considered ticket scalpers,61 and they are often “lumped
together [with unregistered scalpers] as a scalper or secondary market.”62
The internet has brought new challenges to scalpers, along with new protections for
sellers.63 Currently, one of the most significant problems in the ticket market lies in new-age
software specifically designed to ‘hack’ ticket selling websites, thereby allowing scalpers to
bypass the virtual line and by many tickets at once.64 As a result, the modern secondary ticket
market results in an average price-market up of 36%, but this can be higher for super-star acts
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such as U2 (145%) or Bruce Springsteen (240%).65 There is a lot of money to be made in the
business – one recently busted ticket ‘hacking’ and scalping network made $25 million in profit
before being shut down.66 In the year 2000, a study estimated that ticket brokers and scalpers
made a profit of over $87 million.67 The current U.S. secondary market represents a $4 billion a
year industry.68
Modern-day scalpers are so unscrupulous that they will exploit any event—including
charity benefit concerts. This was the case with the Hurricane Sandy Benefit Concert (12/12/12),
featuring such acts as Paul McCartney, Bruce Springsteen, Bon Jovi, Eric Clapton, The Who,
and Kanye West, which was subject to flagrant scalping in extreme amounts.69 Seats available in
primary sale for a maximum of $2500 face value were seen on sale for as much as $60,000.70
Only a handful of sites were carrying the tickets, as some vendors “chose the high road”, such as
Ticketmaster, which barred the sale of tickets in its secondary sites TicketsNow and
TicketExchange.71 StubHub however, allowed the sales and pledged that they would give their
share—25% of the sale—to the Robin Hood Foundation, operator of the concert.72 When all was
said and done, they donated about $1 million to the charity,73 resulting in around $3 million of
profit going to scalpers.
i. Modern Venues and Actors in the resale market
1. Online sites
The major players in the ticket resale market are StubHub TicketLiquidator,
Ticketsnetwork, and TicketsNow.74 There are countless websites that a consumer can use.
These websites provide a venue for individuals to sell and purchase tickets, but also are the cause
of much disdain and conspiracy theorizing.
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StubHub is the household name in ticket resale. The company was originally conceived
by two Stanford university students, Jeff Fluhr and Eric Baker, for a business plan competition,
but they developed such enthusiasm for the project that they decided to make it real.75 As told
by co-founder Jeff Fluhr, there were three characteristics of the secondary resale market that
showed a great opportunity:
Number one: . . . it was a large market in the U.S., . . . we estimated that it could be as
big as ten billion. . . The second characteristic . . . was the fact that it was a highly
fragmented business, so there was no dominant national player that was addressing the
secondary ticket market . . . the third thing . . . was the fact that it was really a
stigmatized market that was leaving consumers with a lack of trust, and sort of a bit of
concern around getting legitimate tickets.76
StubHub launched in August 2000 with $550,000 in early investment.77

The first thing the

entrepreneurs did with their start-up financing was investigate the legality of the enterprise,
hiring a regulatory law firm to perform a nationwide survey of existing law.78 They noted the
lack of federal law,79 and that “most states . . . did not have restrictive ticket resale laws”,80 and
went on to grow a business from a small investment to company that in 2006 had “400 million . .
. of top-line gross ticket sales.”81 In 2005, it had revenue of about 50 million,82 and in 2006
around 100 million.83 StubHub is also a major player in professional sports, as it is currently
partnered with as many as sixty sports teams.84 The founders ultimately sold the company to
eBay in 2007, for $310 million.85
While many are probably pleased with the ease of use and reliability that StubHub
provides, especially given that “almost 50 percent of the tickets [sell for] face value or below”,86
others are extremely frustrated by its existence.87 The purchase of StubHub by eBay spurred
Ticketmaster into action, and it purchased TicketsNow in 2007 “as a defensive move.”88
Many question the large online secondary resale operations. There are those that view
Ticketmaster, and their associated secondary markets, as a monopoly that has no vested interest
7

in correcting these issues,89 the combination being a simple conspiracy “to enrich Ticketmaster,
venues, artists, and scalpers.”90 Unsurprisingly, several years after the purchase there was a
significant issue which drew a lot of attention in 2009.91 Consumers were told on Ticketmaster’s
primary website that the show was sold out, only to be directed from Ticketmaster’s secondary
site TicketsNow, where tickets were available.92
Ticketmaster is also under attack for its attempts to regulate the secondary market using
paperless tickets.93 For example, the Fan Freedom project frequently attacks Ticketmaster, such
as by asking for an investigatory probe into Ticketmaster when it refused to report to authorities
known ticket sniping in event sales.94 The Fan Freedom project argues that paperless tickets hurt
the average consumer.95 However, the Fan Freedom Project is funded by StubHub,96 which has
an obvious vested interest in a thriving secondary resale market, with the uninhibited transfer of
tickets. Further, StubHub has successfully lobbied to protect their business, and changed “the
laws in states like New York, Florida, and Pennsylvania.”97
When the average consumer thinks of buying a ticket to a sold-out event, craiglist is
likely not the first site that comes to mind. However, craigslist is a viable secondary market for
music concerts and sporting events. 98 As with all craigslist categories, new listings are posted
continually on a daily basis, though many of these postings simply direct consumers to other
secondary ticket sites. A general search will list all tickets, both by owner and by dealer, though
the user can narrow down the list based on these categories.99 Tickets by dealer postings will
typically contain links to direct the user to an outside secondary ticket selling website, while
tickets by owner will take you to a nondescript craigslist posting.100 Craigslist disclaims all
liability for the transaction.101
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Similarly, eBay is likely not the first choice of the average consumer, though it too offers
tickets to a wide range of events.102 A note in 2009 commented that a search for “tickets” on
eBay yielded 246,598 results.103 The market has grown—a current search (late 2012) yields
652,978 results.104 eBay places the onus of knowing applicable local law on the seller of the
tickets.105 Unlike craigslist, eBay offers its typical buyer protection, in the event that the tickets
never arrive or if the tickets are not what were advertised.106
Facebook is involved the ticket market. Facebook recently asserted influence in the
primary market by integrating the ticket purchasing experience so the user never leaves the
Facebook page, with such outlets as Ticketmaster, StubHub, Ticketfly.107

Facebook also

partnered with EventBrite,108 a full-service website for anyone hosting an event, which allows
the host to promote the event, create an event web page, and charge admission offering guests
either printable and paperless tickets.109

Eventbrite offers this service for a small fee per

ticket.110 A similar service is available through ThunderTix, for bands to sell tickets to their
shows through their Facebook pages.111
Facebook is also in and of itself a secondary market. This is not surprising, given that the
site is designed to connect people and provides an easy method to make an announcement that
there are tickets for sale. For example, it was recently reported that students and graduates of
Syracuse University, all members of a college-oriented student groups on Facebook, are using
the site as a forum to buy and sell tickets.112 Given the size of Facebook,113 there is no reason to
believe this is an isolated incident.
2. Artists withholding
One current issue in the modern resale market is the lack of transparency in ticket
withholding. Ticket withholding is frustrating to the average consumer, as it results in limited
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available seats to the general public and inflated prices in the secondary market. Some of
described the situation as “a clear consumer protection issue[, as] tickets supposedly being
offered for sale are not available on publicly advertised websites, but are instantly available at
jacked-up prices on resale websites.”114 However, others argue that artists are in control of their
show, and can do what they please with their tickets.
There are many parties involved in ticket withholding, which results in fewer tickets on
sale to the general public. Those involved in ticket withholding include artists, venues, record
companies, talent agencies, radio stations, credit card companies (American Express), and
sponsoring corporations.115 Ticketmaster itself is involved, as “the company routinely offers to
list hundreds of the best tickets per concert on one of its two resale Web sites—and dives the
extra revenue, which can amount to more than $2 million on a major tour, with artists and
promoters.”116 Ticketmaster does this with a range of artists, from Neil Diamond117 to Lady
Gaga.118
Artists are some of the major culprits, as many are withholding tickets to their own shows
for their own purposes, such as passing them along to friends or family. However, a significant
amount end up on secondary resale sites generating a healthy profit.119 For example, Katy Pery
includes ticket withholding and resale in her contract rider.120 Justin Bieber engages in a similar
practice. 121 It is unlikely that this language is overly unique in the industry, as many artists are
withholding tickets, such as Britney Spears, Celine Dion, Bon Jovi, Van Halen, Billy Joel, Elton
John,122 and other artists stand to gain an additional two million in revenue on a tour.123
Fan clubs present another source of ticket resale. Artist’s fan clubs take membership fees
and in exchange give early access to tickets. This gives fans, but also scalpers who pay the
membership fee, early access to tickets. In some extreme examples, Keith Urban charges $25
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(and retains) for fan club membership fees and saw twelve $25 front-row seats for a Hall of
Fame Benefit concert scalped at $642 per ticket;124 Taylor swift charges $20 for dues and offers
primary access to ticket presales to members, resulting in some seats allocated for fans at $49.50
being available for $1177 per ticket.125 Similarly, tickets for a Britney Spears concert priced at
$39.50 were priced at $1,188.60.126
3. ‘Bots’ and ‘Ticket sniping’
In the 1800s, people waited in long lines for tickets. Unfortunately for the average
consumer, oftentimes many of those in line were proxies for ticket speculators. Today, people
wait in “virtual lines” on a website when seeking tickets for shows. Unfortunately for the
average consumer today, when your time arrives there are no more tickets available—they have
all been purchased by scalpers using ‘ticket bots’ who use software to “essentially cut the line
[violating] the first-come, first-served doctrine of a queue[.]”127
With the advent of online ticket sales came new technologically advanced and enhanced
tools for ticket scalping. ‘Bots’ are “automated program[s] that navigate[] website[s] faster and
more efficiently than humans can . . . unscrupulous [programs that allow] ticket resellers to “cut
the line” and grab as many [tickets] as possible for resale at higher prices.”128 Ticket ‘bots’ pose
one of the more serious problems in the modern ticket resale market, and their “prevalence . . .
has already raised questions about the industry’s claims of fairness in online sales.”129 ‘Bot’ use
on Ticketmaster’s website is extremely prevalent, amounting to as much as 80% of ticket
requests on certain days.130
Sellers of the software boast that for only $990, you can bypasses CAPTCHA
technology, quantity limits, and queues, simultaneously “grab[bing] hundreds of tickets for
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multiple event[s] . . . with just a single click.”131

‘Bot’ use is sometimes referred to as

‘Ticketsniping.’132
While ‘bot’ use is rampant, primary ticket sellers are doing their part to try to control
them. Ticketmaster is targeting the creators of the software. Ticketmaster’s paperless ticketing
system is viewed as a strong remedy to ‘bot’ usage and ticket scalping.133 Ticketfly, another
online seller, seeks to control ‘bots’ by using algorithms that recognize behavior that is
impossible for humans to achieve, and then shutting down that computer address.134 Another
tactic is litigation, such as the 2007 case in which Ticketmaster sued RMG Technologies for
developing software that circumvented their anti-scalping measures.135 Ticketmaster emerged
victorious with award of 18.2 million.136 So far several states have enacted legislation to curb
the use of ticket bots.137 Colorado, Tennessee, Indiana, and Minnesota have criminalized ticket
sniping, while North Carolina and Oregon have created for civil remedy.138 New Jersey may
soon join these states, as proposed legislation is making its way through the legislature.139
b. Legislation
i. State
Currently, twenty-eight States regulate ticket resale in some form.140

Seven states

regulate weakly, 11 allow resale in same form.141 However, “most states now accept online
ticket reseller as part of a legitimate, useful and vibrant secondary sales market, especially if the
resellers register with the state, provide consumer protections, and pay taxes as required.”142
The State of New Jersey is contemplating a ticket resale bill, S-875, sponsored by State
Senators Raymond Lesniak (D-Union) and Robert Singer (R-Monmouth and Union), which
would significantly alter the ticket market in in the state.143 A review of this bill provides an
example of the pros, cons, and complexities of legislating the current ticket resale market.
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The bill proposes new additions to existing law, many of which are aimed at increasing
transparency and accountability. The proposed bill would require that all tickets issued bear a
traceable barcode identifying each ticket and its original sale, to be kept on record for five
years.144 Under the proposed legislation, ticket sellers would be required to provide advance
notice to the public, within fifteen days of an event, the total number of tickets issued that are for
public sale, those that are not for public sale, and those that are given to fan clubs, business, or
other promotions.145 The act would also forbid insiders146, which includes the venue, agent,
producer, and the artist, from selling tickets prior to general sale.147
Lesniak and Singer’s proposed bill stands to protect the consumer interests of New
Jersey. The proposed legislation also directly targets limitations imposed on the consumers
ability to resell a

or exchange tickets, by forbidding such devices as restrictive e-tickets,

conditioning entry on the presentation of a document, or requiring a ‘will call’ method for
picking up tickets.148 S-875 also ameliorates consumer concerns of monopolization of secondary
ticketing by eliminating the ability for a primary seller to impose a restriction that requires a
ticket be sold through a specific channel.149
S-875 also targets the technological advancements that have made for widespread abuse
in the secondary market—ticket bots. The proposed legislation forbids the use of technology to
disguise identity so as to gain access to more tickets by circumventing the limitations imposed by
the owner or operator of the event,150 or to skip waiting queues or other limitations imposed by
the primary seller.151
The proposal also adds serious penalties.152

S-875 proposes that “any person who

violates [the law] shall be subject to all remedies and penalties available pursuant to the
[Consumer Fraud Act,]” meaning $10,000 for a first offense, $20,000 for a repeat offense.153 S-
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875 also proposes that violators are guilty of a crime in the 4th degree,154 a misdemeanor.155
Classification as a crime of the 4th degree carries a sentence of imprisonment of up to 18
months.156
While S-875 benefits the consumer in key ways, it simultaneously and unquestionably
benefits the secondary sales market. Section 8 of the proposed Act forbids a ticket issuer from
bringing legal action against secondary sellers for violation of their restrictions on secondary sale
—be it the average person, “who facilitate[s] or provide[s] services for the resale of tickets[,]” or
the online powerhouse StubHub, “[t]he operator of a physical or electronic marketplace in which
a ticket is offered for resale[.]”157
Further, the proposed legislation also removes key language from existing law. The Act
repeals the existing special regulation of ticket brokers and would end the requirement that ticket
brokers register with the division of Consumer Affairs. S-875 also removes the portion of
existing law that places a ceiling price on ticket resale, by eliminating language that restricts the
resale of a ticket by an average person in excess of 20% of the ticket price, or the registered
ticket broker from purchasing a ticket with the intent of reselling the ticket in excess of 50% of
price paid to acquire the ticket.158
The bill is being met with both support and hesitation. There are those that support the
ban on restrictive tickets.159 However, many disagree. The CEO of the New Jersey Sports &
Exposition Authority opined that while he understands the intent of the bill and does not oppose
what it seeks to address, “there are practical consequences in what’s set forth right now.” 160 The
CIO of the same organization believes the bill is unnecessary, as less than one percent of tickets
are paperless.161 It is understandable that the concert industry would “balk” at the legislation’s
restriction on venues withholding tickets for direct sale in the secondary market, as it “would
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presumably [result in] a violation of . . . the Consumer Fraud Act, which can include minimum
fines of $10,000.”162 Further, some believe that the bill in its current form will make the state
less attractive as a venue, and that artists will take their shows to other states.163
ii. Federal
1. Incorrectly applied law
There is some federal legislation that is not directly aimed at ticket scalping and online
resale, but attempts have been made to apply it.

At least two federal acts have been

inappropriately applied to ‘new-age’ ticket scalping; the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”)
and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”).
The Communications Decency Act of 1996164 is a federal act with numerous affects, one
of which is the treatment of online resale operations under state law. It was enacted in direct
response to court decisions that placed the risk of liability on service providers that regulated
offensive material on their sites; the presumed effect of these holdings was that “service
providers [would be deterred] from blocking and screening offensive material.”165
The CDA was adopted to “remove disincentives” from service providers so as to allow
them to regulate and filter the material on their sites.166 The Act is designed to “preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”167 One of the ways the Act
achieves this end is to “immunize providers of interactive computer services from civil liability
in tort with respect to material disseminated by them but created by others.”168 The result under
§ 230 is that much like online message boards,169 eBay,170 and Amazon.com,171 resale sites such
as StubHub, TicketsNow, and Cheaptickets may not liable for the third party content on their
websites—the tickets sold.172
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This was the result obtained in Milgram v. Orbitz, in which the State of New Jersey
recently sued TicketsNetwork,173 a large online ticket market that contains up to seven million
tickets for sale from third party sellers at any time.174 In response to the ticketing fiasco
surrounding the 2009 Bruce Springsteen tour,175 the State was targeting the sale of tickets prior
to the general on-sale date and sellers failing to inform consumers that they did not physically
possess and control the offered tickets at the time of sale.176 Both of these actions are forbidden
by TicketNetwork’s terms of use.177 Similarly, the state argued, these acts were in violation of
New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act.178
Under § 230, immunity is given to ‘interactive computer services’ that act as publishers
of third party information, as opposed to those that become ‘information content providers,’
transcending mere publishing into actual creation of content.179

The Court in Milgram

determined that TicketNetwork was an “interactive computer service,”180 and imported the
reasoning from two defamation cases, which were deemed applicable to ticket sales.181
Ultimately, the Court determined that TicketNetwork was not liable under the State’s Consumer
Fraud Act182, as § 230 “afforded . . . broad immunity.”183
The court in New Jersey noted that there is contrary, though non-binding authority in
NPS, LLC v. Stubhub.184 In NPS, the New England Patriots sued StubHub over the resale of
season tickets on their site, and StubHub’s motion for partial summary judgment on the count of
intentional interference was denied.185 The court determined that while StubHub would not lose
immunity under § 230 for simply knowing of illegal activity on the site,186 if it was proven that
StubHub engaged in the level of knowing sufficient to constitute illegal ticket scalping, it would
not receive section § 230 immunity.187
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It is debatable if the CDA should apply to ticket resellers or online auction houses. The
Act’s primary purpose “was to control the exposure of minors to indecent material.”188 Section
230 immunity is based on the actor’s status as a publisher,189 possibly as a distributor.190 This is
why most § 230 suits are about defamation.191
Given § 230’s focus on contribution to speech website content, it could be said it is a
stretch to apply the Act to an online resale sites.192 The Seventh Circuit has deemed the section
does not in fact create immunity, and when StubHub sought to invoke § 230(c)(1) in the context
of a tax lawsuit, the court dismissed the Act as irrelevant outside of the context of publishing
information or speech.193 Further, the Seventh the Circuit intimated that § 230 may operate as a
definitional statute.194
In any event, § 230 must not create a comprehensive immunity, as online music sharing
services that enable copyright infringement “may be liable for contributory infringement if their
system is designed to help people steal music or other material in copyright.”195 Similarly, § 230
should does not protect online resale websites to the extent that knowingly and purposefully
violate the law.196
However, the argument for § 230 providing this ‘immunity’ is understandable. The same
logic applies to eBay or StubHub as much as it applies to an online message board—the sites
should be incentivized to regulate illegitimate content, and should not avoid doing so for fear of
liability.197 Further, the sites do not create the content (the tickets)—this is done by a third party,
and which is the precise immunity the CDA provides.198 However, the Act seems designed to
protect speech and to insulate the websites that seek to regulating their content, thereby keeping
robust political discourse but protecting children from offensive material.199 Nonetheless, the
CDA does not expressly state that § 230 immunity should not apply to these types of websites.200
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Another Act applied to ticket scalping is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which is
directed at unauthorized computer access. While a thorough discussion addressing the nuances
of the CFAA is outside the scope of this paper, it is notable that the Act has been raised in both
civil and criminal courts as a potential weapon against abuse in the ticket market. However, use
of the Act in the context of ticket reselling raises concern.
The CFAA was passed in 1984, and is designed to criminalize unauthorized access to
computers.201 The Act was “originally designed to criminalize only important federal interest
computer crimes,” but has been expanded many times, making it ”one of the most far-reaching
criminal laws in the United States Code.”202 Though a criminal statute, the CFAA allows for
plaintiff’s “who suffer[] damage or loss . . . to maintain civil action[s] . . . to obtain
compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.”203 The CFAA is mostly
applied in civil actions and not criminal cases.204

It is because of these expansions that attempts

have been made to apply the law against ticket scalpers.
In 2010, four men from California, working collectively as “Wiseguys Tickets,” were
brought up on charges for their actions in the ticket market, which affected numerous sporting
events and concerts.205 The Wiseguys cyber fraud enterprise manipulated the ticket market,
growing to an estimated value of $25 million.206 Essentially, the Wiseguys obtained tickets
before the general public even got a chance, only to resell them to that public at inflated prices.
The resulting case was United States v. Lowson in the District of New Jersey, in which
Attorney General Paul Fishman sued the four individuals alleging violations of the CFAA.207
The U.S. sought to hold the Wiseguys accountable for ‘hacking’ Ticketmaster’s website in “one
of the largest [cases] in the history of the ticketing business.”208

Wiseguys recruited

programmers from Bulgaria to circumvent CAPTCHA technology, and used ‘bots’ to circumvent
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as virtual lines and limits per customer.209 The Wiseguys “allegedly created and managed
hundreds of fake Internet domains and thousands of addresses to disguise their activities from
online ticket sellers.”210 Despite the seemingly deliberate fraud engaged in by the defendants in
Lowson, and a potential sentence of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine,211 a plea of “guilty
to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and gain unauthorized access to protected computers”212
resulted in a mild sentence. In addition to rescission of profits and community service,213 the
Honorable Katherine Sweeney Hayden (D. N.J.) sentenced the defendants to two years’
probation and alcohol & drug treatment.214
Though the Judge’s opinion was criticized by some as being too lenient,215 there were
those that were pleased with the outcome.216 The potential implications that an expansive view of
the Act may bring are worth pause. As Judge Hayden noted, though Lowson was a criminal
case, it was about “e-commerce” and the “state of the law is very gray.”217 If the CFAA is
interpreted broadly, a user who engages in contractual violation of a website’s term of service
could face criminal penalty. This would result in a potential sea change, in which private actors
fundamentally create criminal law.
This is why a similar result was obtained in U.S. v. Drew, an earlier CFAA case in which
a jury convicted the defendant of misdemeanor charges for violating the terms of use imposed by
the Myspace website.218 The defendant’s motion for acquittal was granted on appeal.219 The
Court had the same concern raised in Lowson—to criminalize the conduct of violating a
website’s terms of use would result in many innocent Internet users being converted into
misdemeanor criminals.220 Further, criminalizing the conduct on a websites term of service leads
to vagueness problems,221 and is an interpretation of the Act that must be rejected.222
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Several articles have commented on the CFAA, address issues of vagueness and over
breadth,223 and the potential of the act of criminalizing a broad range of conduct.224 Similarly,
amicus briefs were submitted in both the Lowson and Drew cases, opining that the CFAA must
not be so applied.225
2. Proposed Legislation
In 1998, Congressman Gary Ackerman of New York proposed the ‘Ticket Scalping
Reduction Act.’226 It was a scant but imposing legislation. The proposed act defined scalping as
the resale of a “ticket at a markup of more than $5 or 10 percent of the face value[.]” 227 The act
provided that anyone in violation of the act—those who “scalped” 5 or more tickets in any single
transaction—“shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.”228
Several years later, Representative Bill Pascrell of New Jersey achieved some modicum
of fame from his proposed legislation that addresses issues in the secondary ticket market.
Pascrell borrows the moniker of one of New Jersey’s most famous natives for the acronym of the
BOSS Act, or Better Oversight of Secondary Sales and Accountability in Concert Ticketing Act.
The proposed BOSS Act would utilize the FTC as the enforcement arm to offers
consumers much need relief from abuse in the secondary ticket market.229 A violation of the Act
is considered the equivalent of an unfair or deceptive act or practice.230 The Act would allow the
Attorney General of any state to bring suit under the Act,231 and the District Courts would have a
wide array of remedies at their disposal.232
The BOSS Act would provide for transparency and accountability in the ticket market.
The Act requires that ticket sellers be registered and provide viable contact information.233
Primary ticket sellers must disclose the total number of tickets offered for sale as well as the
amount and distribution of tickets that are not available to the general public.234 They must also
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include the face value and any other associated charges or fees.235 Secondary sellers must clearly
state if they possess the ticket at the time of sale and provide procedures for refund if the ticket is
not as advertised.236 Online resale marketplaces must disclose to the consumer if the secondary
seller is a primary seller, venue, or artist.237
The BOSS Act also calls for some significant changes in to the market. These drastic and
potentially efficacious changes include the prohibition on purchase of tickets by a secondary
seller during the first 48 hours of primary sale238 and the prohibition on the resale of ticket by
employees of the venue, primary ticket sellers, artists, online resale marketplaces, and box
offices, if that resale is for a higher price than face value, or if made to a third party that intends
to resell. 239 A newest version of the Act, not yet formally introduced, includes the most needed
regulation of all, directly targeting computer ‘bot’ software and paperless tickets
transferability.240 As officially proposed, the BOSS Act has so far failed to gain any traction in
the Senate. It is not without its critics.241
c. Themes
As in the 1800s, the modern ticket market is similar in least three major ways. First,
tickets are often unavailable in the primary market, leaving the average consumer to search for
tickets in the secondary market, as discussed above. Second, the absence of legislation results in
private efforts to curb the problem. Third, society is engaged in a philosophical debate—there
are those of the belief that the scalpers are not a problem, but serve a valuable purpose.
i. Private Ordering
1. Ticketmaster’s measures
Ticketmaster is no stranger to playing the villain and is frequently lambasted. However,
Ticketmaster does seek to control the ticket market and institute “a fair and equitable ticket
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buying process.”242 Ticketmaster employs several methods to achieve this goal. The first of
these methods is contract. Ticketmaster’s website carries “Terms of Service” which prohibit the
use of the site for commercial gain and using a computer program to navigate the site
automatically.243 The agreement also limits the number of tickets available to each individual
purchaser in a single transaction.244 Ticketmaster also “employs a number of technological
means,” such as CAPTCHA technology, which aim to prevent the raiding of Ticketmaster’s
website by ticket bots.245 Ticketmaster has also recently adopted the paperless ticket as the latest
means against scalping.246
a. Paperless
The ticket resale industry, like so many other industries, has been changed by the
internet. Tickets are readily available for sold out events on any number of websites. One aspect
of live entertainment that had remained relatively consistent was the physical ticket itself as
being transferrable from one person to another, be it as a gift or sold for a profit (prohibitive
legislation aside). Indeed, there have been recent advances, such as the ability for the consumer
to digitally download and print tickets at home before going to the venue,247 but these tickets
may still be sold in the secondary market. A recent development designed to curb the secondary
market is being heralded as a sea change—paperless ticketing.
Paperless ticketing is available in railroad travel,248 air travel,249 and recently, the
entertainment industry;250 for concerts251 and sporting events.252 Paperless ticketing is purported
to help the consumer as a means of preventing “fraud by eliminating a paper-based ticket and
only using electronic information to verify a purchaser’s identity.”253 Paperless ticketing appears
to be the future, as Apple is developing a paperless ticketing app for both concerts254 and
travel.255 Ticketmaster, who recently adopted the paperless ticket,256 claims that the new ticket
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offers fans “more convenience,” as the customer does not have to stand in line at a will-call
window.257 With a paperless ticket, the user receives no physical paper ticket or digital file for
print, but must bring the credit card used to purchase the ‘tickets’ online and present it at the
door.258
By linking entrance to the venue with the credit card of purchase, paperless tickets seek
to control the secondary market.259 By requiring the credit card of purchaser at the point of
entry, paperless ticketing places a significant road block to large-scale ticket resale operations
and at the same time curtails the possibility of resale for the average consumer.

260

At this time,

paperless tickets are a small part of the overall market.261
Though Ticketmaster’s adoption of paperless tickets attempts to benefit fans by
preventing this type of fraud, it has resulted in outrage.262 The opponents argue that paperless
ticketing in concerts and sporting events raise consumer protection and competition issues.263
Paperless tickets encumber the average consumer by limiting their ability to resell a ticket, and
placing restriction on entrance to an event. The proponents of paperless tickets contend that
paperless ticketing will limit abuse in the secondary market, though this may not be a total
success.
Paperless tickets are designed to limit ticket resale by linking the ticket itself to the
individual purchaser.

Paperless ticketing finds its supporters in primary sellers such as

Ticketmaster and LiveNation, but also in the artists themselves, like Bruce Springsteen.264 North
America Ticketmaster spokesperson Jacqueline Peterson attests that it would be “very
challenging” for scalpers to sell paperless tickets.265 Indeed, paperless tickets are an effective
means of curbing the use of ticket bots.266 However, it is easy to conceive of ways to circumvent
paperless ticketing restrictions. For example, the reseller could buy the paperless tickets with
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multiple credit cards as before, then have an agent go to the venue with the purchasers and
transfer the tickets at the door.
Opponents of paperless tickets feel that “[p]aperless tickets sound convenient . . .[b]ut in
truth, they’re a nightmare for fans.”267 Paperless tickets are believed to infringe on the consumer
by restricting gifting of tickets, restricting the resale of tickets, limiting availability of tickets to
sold-out shows, causing delay at the venue as patrons have id and credit card checked, all while
granting Ticketmaster a monopoly over the process.268 The paperless ticket system also causes a
significant inconvenience in entering the venue.

With Ticketmaster’s paperless ticketing,

multiple patrons under one friend’s or family member’s credit card must all enter at the same
time.269
Consumers can find solace in the possibility of reselling their tickets on Ticketmaster’s
secondary ticket exchange site, TicketsExchange, if the venue and artist and promoter allow for
this.270 However, there may be limitations placed on the resale, such as not being allowed to sell
the ticket for below face value.271 Again, this does not solve the problem, as a significant gripe
lies with Ticketmaster’s control over the entire process.272 Further, if Ticketmaster controls this
process, they can charge fees, or implement minimum resale prices.273
Consumers in New York are so frustrated with paperless ticketing that a class action was
recently filed in the District Court against LiveNation and Ticketmaster, alleging that the
companies violated New York State law by only offering paperless tickets.274 The plaintiffs
allege that the sellers violate state law by not allowing an option to transfer the ticket.275
However, consumers must decide which is more frustrating—the use of ticket bots resulting in
increased prices, or the restrictions of paperless tickets.276
2. Variable Pricing, Auctions, and Aggregators
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Another recent development in the ticket market for sporting events is variable pricing, a
tactic borrowed from Broadway and Airline tickets,277 which is deemed a way to help combat
scalping.278

Variable pricing describes the method of pricing based on an estimation of

consumer demand; charging higher prices for more popular opponents or popular nights, such as
weekend games.279 Many MLB baseball teams have instituted variable ticket pricing.280

The

pricing mechanism helps ball clubs who would otherwise be absorbing the loss of unsold
seats.281 Fan reaction is mixed to variable ticket pricing, as some fans view it as price gouging,
others may recognize the potential in subsidizing less popular games.282
Yet another innovation designed to curb ticket scalping is dynamic pricing, in which
“promoters and artists [sell] the most desirable seats in an auction format.”283 Variable pricing
allows the ticket seller to match prices to market fluctuation, and may in fact be the future of
ticket pricing.284 Dynamic pricing is viewed as another tool against ticket scalping,285and as the
wave of the future.286
Yet another innovation is an aggregator website, such SeatGeek, which sorts tickets from
dozens of websites and lists them in a single page.287

Basically, the website shows you the

tickets in a rank order based on a predictive score, incorporating such factors as consumer
preference and “the gap between the asking price and the predicted market value of the ticket.”288
Ticket aggregators can put pressure on the ticket market, possibly resulting in lower fees.289
3. Artists’ Own Actions
One solution lies in the control of the individual artist. As with many other aspects of
show business, the artist can retain control over aspects of the performance, though their ability
to do so depends on their bargaining power (popularity). If the artist wanted to exercise control
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over the ticketing aspect of their show, they can. Artists can curb abuse through paperless tickets
or other unique limitations on resale.
In terms of creativity, look no further than comedian Louis C.K.

When recently

frustrated with ticket resale abuse of his shows and its effect on his fans, the comedian adopted
his own ticket policy in an experiment.290 The policy placed limitations on the person’s ability to
make profit off a ticket, and was designed to directly curb the type of digital scalping we are
growing familiar with.
You’ll see that if you try to sell the ticket anywhere for anything above the original
price, we have the right to cancel your ticket (and refund your money). This is
something I intend to enforce. There are some other rules you may find annoying but
they are meant to prevent someone who has no intention of seeing the show from
buying the ticket and just flipping it for twice the price from a thousand miles away.291
The policy resulted in a 96% decrease in scalping, and still resulted in over 6 million in tickets
sold.292
The British rock band Radiohead has been known as progressive for most of its career.
They achieved some notoriety in 2007 when they conduct an experiment, selling their album “In
Rainbows” online for a pay-what-you-want price.293 They are no less pragmatic when it comes
to their concerts. In response to the woes of many fans paying inflated prices for tickets,
Radiohead recently partnered with Ticket Trust, so that members of the band’s fan club who are
no able to attend the concert can resell their tickets through their website at face value.294 The
band is also known to use paperless ticketing to control inflated prices in the secondary market,
though this is not well received by fans.295 They also go as far as to limit the number of tickets
sold to each individual purchaser; some of the band’s recent shows in the New York City area
were sold digitally on a two-person per household basis.296
ii. Attitude and philosophy

26

As in the 1800s, ticket scalping today is disliked,297 but also subject to debate.298 Some
want legislation,299 and others wanting a free market without restriction.300 Opinions vary from
those that are not upset about inflated prices and are willing to pay more for a second chance,301
to those that lament the way that base prices for concert tickets are currently being set and its
resemblance to “the health insurance industry or the bank industry—they see an opportunity for a
lot of money and they exploit it.”302
Modern day ticket prices are based on “a perceived notion of fairness—that the face
value of a ticket is actually the ‘fair value.’”303 Ticket scalping legislation is based on the public
perception that resale of tickets above market value is unfair, “despite making economic
sense.”304 However, some assert that the secondary market is natural, given the underpricing of
concert seats.305 The face value of a ticket is typically below the market value, which leaves a
“consumer surplus”—“the positive difference between what they would have paid for the ticket
and the price they actually paid.”306 As in the 1800s, modern day online ticket scalpers attempt
to capture this “consumer surplus” by buying the tickets in bulk before the consumer has a
chance, and then reselling them to the consumer, often at an inflated price.307
Ticket scalping is not without its proponents,308 as ticket scalpers are not without their
benefits.309 It gives those who could not (or chose not) to wait in line an opportunity to purchase
tickets.310 Some people are not upset about inflated prices, and are willing to pay more for a
second chance.311

Some believe that the market simply controls and corrects itself.312 Some

argue that market corrections the most prevalent problems, such as ticket sniping, with schemes
like variable pricing and paperless ticketing, makes legislation unnecessary.313
Society reacts to problems it perceives as worthy. As in the 1800s, many are frustrated
by the way the ticket resale market is seemingly allowed to operate as it does, allowing those
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who purchased a bulk of tickets or withheld tickets to resale them at significantly increased
profit. Though this frustrates many who complain about the unavailability of tickets, inflated
prices, and the use of ticket bots, there is little legislation addressing the sources of the problem.
However, when scalpers were selling tickets to the Hurricane Sandy Benefit Concert, the
legislature was quick to react to what was deemed truly appalling, and quickly proposed law
outlawing the resale of tickets to charity events for higher than face value.314 Until society
deems the scalping of a wide array of concerts on a daily basis as worthy, there can be no
significant legislative change. Given that the scalping legislation started on a significant basis
well into the 1900s, we may have to wait some time. By that time, private ordering may have
addressed the problem to the satisfaction of the consumer through such methods as increased
security, variable pricing and paperless technology.315
III.

Proposal: Federal legislation or a uniform code on the regulation of secondary sales
The issues we face in the modern ticket market are similar to those caused by ticket

scalpers in the 1800s, albeit with different actors in a different form and in a different time.
Time has proven that the problem of ticket speculation is not an easy one to fix,316 and that
widespread legislation may be some years if it comes at all. Some argue that legislation is illequipped to address modern-day ticket scalping, and therefore not needed as the market
successfully responded on its own by implementing variable pricing and paperless tickets.317
Before any legal solution can be developed, society must decide that the current ticket
market is so unfair that it in fact requires regulation. As of yet, our society does not yet appear
so displeased, or the legislature does not perceive it to be. When ticket scalpers targeted the
Sandy Benefit Concert, the legislature was quick to respond with restrictions targeting the resale
of charity concert tickets.318

Presumably, everyone agrees that scalping for a charity benefit
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concert is and should be impermissible. The everyday concert, however, produces strong views
both in favor of secondary sale, and in favor of regulating or prohibiting secondary sale.
There are different perspectives of fairness—fairness of the public’s access to what is
perceived to be a fair price of a ticket in face value, and fairness in allowing the price of a ticket
to be dictated by the free market. If society deems it important enough, legislation should
address the major issues and consumer concerns in the market: these include ticket ‘bots and
ticket sniping, disclosure, price ceiling, ambiguity in applicable law, and paperless restrictions.
Given the strong foundation present in the Bill Pascrall’s proposed BOSS Act, I would
propose a BOSS Act “Plus.” While the BOSS Act is not a perfect piece of legislation, it is a
promising and viable option which will do exactly what it aims to do—namely, provide better
oversight of secondary sales and accountability in concert ticketing. In its current proposed
forms, the BOSS Act does not address ticket bots or paperless tickets.319 However, the next
iteration of the Act will contain regulation targeting both ticket bots and paperless tickets. That
being the case, the only “Plus” I would recommend would be to include a clarification of the
applicability of the CDA and CFAA to internet related scalping issues.
National legislation is a viable option and should be encouraged. Without uniformity,
individual states will comprise an uneven playing field of ticket resale legality, and registration
and disclosure requirements. Given the prevalence of technology and the ease of operating from
a distance, prohibitive legislation on a local scale is of limited value. Online websites make
statewide or local legislation difficult to enforce.

320

Federal legislation “may create more

uniform enforcement and ease jurisdictional problems.”321 Further, individual states that decide
to regulate ticket resale, in both transparency of ticket withholding and prohibition on resale,
may suffer the loss of talent in its venues, as artists take their act across the border.322
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If Congress is reluctant to address ticket scalping on a federal level, the states could seek
to adopt a uniform legislation; a Uniform Ticket Resale Act. Uniform legislation would serve to
address the problems of scalpers moving across state lines or operating from a distance. It would
also remedy, to the extent adopted, issues of one state being ‘less attractive’ than another based
on its local law and potentially stricter ticket resale law.
CONCLUSION
Many of the same problems that faced the consumer in the 1800s face the consumer today. The
‘virtual line’ is cut by a modern day scalper with computer software, are then listed with
secondary sellers. As in the 1800s, legislation is sparse and ill-equipped to address the issue.
States seem to allow the practice. The current ticket market has responded with its own measures
to address scalping problems, which come with their own issues. Incorrect federal law has been
applied. A uniform ticket resale law is recommended to clarify this ambiguity and remedy ticket
resale issues across the several states, and address the modern day problems of ticket bots and
remedy of paperless tickets. It may be some time before this occurs, if ever.
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